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 1  Frege on truth 
 Frege tells us surprisingly little about  truth. And some of what little 
he does say, he repeats:
 One can, indeed, say: ‘The thought that 5 is a prime number is true’. But 
closer examination shows that nothing more has been said than in the sim-
ple sentence ‘5 is a prime number’. The truth claim arises in each case from 
the assertoric sentence, and when the latter lacks the usual force, e.g., in 
the mouth of an actor upon the stage, even the sentence ‘The thought that 
5 is a prime number is true’ contains only a thought, and indeed the same 
thought as the simple ‘5 is a prime number’. 1 
Whereas in the much later ‘Thoughts’ from 1918 it is sameness of 
thought/content that is emphasized: 
 It is also worth noticing that the sentence ‘I smell the scent of violets’ has 
just the same content as the sentence ‘It is true that I smell the scent of 
violets’. 2 
 in the 1897(?) ‘Logic’ we fi nd the emphasis is on assertion:
If I assert that the sum of 2 and 3 is 5, then I thereby assert that it is true 
that 2 and 3 make 5. 3 
Strictly, the claim about  assertion is distinct from that about 
 content (sameness of thought). It could be that it is a fact about 
assertion,  e.g. , that it aims at truth, as people say, that nothing 
different is accomplished in asserting that the sum of 2 and 3 
 1  ‘On sense and reference’,  CP , p. 164. 
 2  ‘Thoughts’,  CP , p. 354. 
 3  ‘Logic’,  PW , p. 129. 
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is 5 and that it is true that the sum of 2 and 3 is 5, rather than a 
fact about the contents asserted. But this is not Frege’s view. In 
both ‘On sense and reference’ and ‘Thoughts’ Frege points to a 
certain  redundancy where truth is concerned. For any assertoric 
sentence  p ,  p and ‘It’s true that  p ’ have ‘just the same content’ 
(‘Thoughts’), they ‘contain the same thought’ (‘On sense and ref-
erence’). Nevertheless, in contemporary terms, Frege is no  defl a-
tionist. He asks rhetorically, ‘And yet is it not a great result when 
the scientist after much hesitation and laborious researches can 
fi nally say, “My conjecture is true”?’ 
 A  true thought refers to the True; properly speaking,  truth is 
not a property of true thoughts (‘On sense and reference’, p. 164; 
‘Thoughts’, pp. 354–5). Frege is, to modern eyes, surprisingly lax 
regarding the difference between a truth-operator and a truth-pred-
icate. While truth may not be a property of true thoughts – they 
refer to the True rather than falling under some concept – it is hard 
to see a  truth-predicate as doing anything other than picking out 
some property common to all true sentences: to be sure, a language-
relative property, and one possessed derivative upon the sentences 
expressing (in the context of use) a thought that refers to the True. 
 As is well known, Frege rejects  the correspondence theory of 
truth. The content of the word ‘true’ is, he says,  sui generis and 
 indefi nable; the meaning of the word ‘true’ seems to be altogether 
 sui generis (‘Thoughts’, pp. 353, 354). Here’s the best gloss I can put 
in his remarks about truth. 4 
 There should be no difference at all between asking, for suit-
able  p , whether  p and whether it’s true that  p (e.g., there is no dif-
ference between asking whether Jena is a city on the Saale and 
asking whether it is true that Jena is a city on the Saale). This gets us 
to Frege’s fundamental thought: that knowledge of what it takes for 
a particular sentence to be true cannot be something added on after 
an  understanding of the sentence itself. An understanding of what it 
is to be true (‘in general’) cannot come after an understanding of the 
rest of the language, as would be possible if it were possible to offer 
a proper  defi nition of truth. 
 4  I owe some of this to Luis Fernández Moreno, ‘Die Undefi nierbarkeit der Wahrheit 
bei Frege’,  Dialectica , 50 ( 1996 ), pp. 25–35. 
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 Frege says: ‘If I do not know that a picture is meant to represent 
Cologne Cathedral then I do not know what to compare the picture 
with in order to decide on its truth.’ In the case of a declarative sen-
tence there is  never an equivalent problem,  if one understands the 
sentence , i.e.  if one knows the thought it expresses . If one under-
stands a sentence then one knows how the world must be for (the 
thought expressed by) the sentence to be true. 
 A thought is something for which the question of truth can prop-
erly be raised. The  only thing for which the question of truth can 
properly be raised is the sense expressed by an assertoric or inter-
rogative sentence, so this is a thought. ‘Truth does not consist 
in correspondence of the sense with something else’ (‘Thoughts’, 
p. 353). Although it is not at fi rst obvious, this connects with some-
thing Frege says much later on in ‘Thoughts’: ‘What is a fact? A fact 
is a thought that is true’ (‘Thoughts’, p. 368). This is, at fi rst glance, 
a very odd conception of facts. Thought through carefully, it may 
not be compelling but it does tie in with how we should think about 
Fregean thoughts. 
 Think of declarative sentences in a language (or perhaps some of 
the stuff inside your head) as  ‘representations’. One uses them to 
represent ‘ways the world might be’, to speak very loosely. In  assert-
ing a declarative sentence one is claiming things  are that way. What 
is the  content expressed by a sentence, the  content of what does the 
representing? It is what is represented: a way things might be. When 
is the representation correct? When is the sentence true? – When 
the way it represents things as being is the way (or, perhaps better, a 
way) things are. Put another way, a Fregean thought is  not a ‘picture’ 
or representation of a way things might be; rather, it is the way they 
are represented as being. 
 Now, if one ascribes truth to sentences, then, as said above, a sen-
tence is true if the way it represents things as being is a way things 
are. But if, like Frege, one ascribes truth primarily to thoughts, 
then it is what is represented, not the representation, that is true (or 
false). And the various ways things are are just some among the way 
things might be. They’re the true ones, the facts. There is no separ-
ation between truths, true thoughts, and facts. Facts and truths are 
the same things, namely – staying with the way I have been speak-
ing – ways things are. Thus Frege ends up with what by his own 
lights is a perfectly good correspondence theory: thoughts are true 
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if they are identical with, i.e. correspond perfectly to, facts. Frege is 
an identity theorist of sorts. 5 
 This argument turns on Frege (i) taking, if we may speak loosely, 
truth to be a property of what is represented, not of what does the 
representing, and (ii) treating what I have called ways things might 
be fully on a par with what I have called ways things are. Now, one 
may reasonably object to an identity theory of truth of Frege’s sort, 
a theory that identifi es facts with true propositions/thoughts, that 
the role of the world in determining which propositions are true has 
been lost. It’s all very well identifying facts and true propositions but 
what is it that fi xes the facts? We may resolve that matter if the world 
is, to borrow a phrase, the totality of facts, but only by granting an 
explanatory priority to facts that is not Frege’s. Truth is, for Frege, 
unanalysable. Jena falls under the concept  city on the Saale because 
the thought  That Jena is a city on the Saale refers to the True. That is 
the order of explanation, not, if we take Frege at his word, the reverse. 
We may limn the laws of truth – the laws of logic – but we cannot 
give a general account of what it takes for a thought to be true. 6 
 What I have just elaborated is the picture that emerges most 
clearly from  ‘Thoughts’, a late post-paradox piece that contains 
Frege’s only extended discussion of truth – compressed as it may 
be – in an article that covers an awful lot of ground. How much or 
how little can be projected back to the 1890s is far from clear. On the 
one hand, there is the complete absence of any mention of concepts 
in ‘Thoughts’. On the other, in the close to contemporaneous ‘Notes 
 5  Cf . Julian Dodd and Jennifer Hornsby, ‘The identity theory of truth: Reply to 
Baldwin’,  Mind , 101 ( 1992 ), pp. 319–22. 
 6  Russell objected to coherence theories of truth that there could be more than one 
maximal consistent set of beliefs. Likewise, there can be more than one maximal 
consistent set of Fregean thoughts and it would seem that the world must some-
how play a role in determining the set which is the set of true thoughts (facts). 
Perhaps because he was concerned as much with mathematical truths as empiri-
cal ones, Frege says little regarding contingency and modality generally. 
 Crispin Wright has objected persuasively that coherence theories have a hard 
job in accommodating contingency say in the sense of genuine chance events 
(‘Truth: A traditional debate reviewed’, in S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.), 
 Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 203–38. at pp. 221–2). That is 
not the objection here. The objection here to a Fregean identity theory is more 
fundamental: it is that we are given no clue as to what fi xes the set of truths. The 
coherence-theorist has a story to tell about that; Wright’s complaint is that that 
story is defective. 
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for Ludwig Darmstaedter’ (as the editors of the  Nachlass call it), we 
fi nd doctrines of long standing reiterated and others portrayed as 
being of long standing. 
 What is distinctive about my conception of logic is that I begin by giving 
pride of place to the content of the word ‘true’, and then immediately go on 
to introduce a thought as that to which the question ‘Is it true?’ is in prin-
ciple applicable. So I do not begin with concepts and put them together to 
form a thought or judgement; I come by the parts of a thought by analysing 
the thought. 
 … The fi rst thing that strikes us here is that a thought is made up out of 
parts that are not themselves thoughts. The simplest case of this kind is 
where one of the two parts is in need of supplementation and is completed 
by the other part, which is saturated: that is to say, it is not in need of sup-
plementation. The former part then corresponds to a concept, the latter to 
an object (subsumption of an object under a concept). 7 
What is clear is that Frege’s  practice in  Die Grundgesetze der 
Arithmetik is quite different. In §31 he expounds what purports to 
be a proof that  every proper name (including sentences) and fi rst-
level function name formed according to the procedures he lays 
down in §30 has a reference. To carry out the proof he proceeds 
‘recursively’, starting with the primitive signs, using the explana-
tions previously given of them, and moving on to more complex 
expressions. This ‘proof’ immediately precedes a section with the 
title ‘Every proposition of  Begriffsschrift expresses a thought’, the 
fi rst sentence of which summarizes what has, supposedly, been 
accomplished in §31: ‘In this way it is shown that our eight primi-
tive names have denotation, and thereby that the same holds good 
for all names correctly compounded out of them.’ As the system of 
 Grundgesetze is inconsistent, the proof must fail. The nub is the 
 7  ‘Notes for Ludwig Darmstaedter’,  PW , pp. 253–4. Missing from the Darmstaedter 
notes is any mention of extensions of concepts. The notes end with brief remarks 
on numerical quantifi ers – expressions of the form ‘There are  n …’ – which on 
Frege’s reckoning are second-level concepts. The closing lines are:
But still we do not have in them the numbers of arithmetic; we do not yet have 
objects, but concepts. How can we get from these concepts to the numbers of 
arithmetic in a way that cannot be faulted? Or are there simply no numbers in 
arithmetic? Could the numerals help us to form signs for these second level con-
cepts and yet not be signs in their own right? (ibid., p. 257) 
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use of second-order quantifi ers in forming predicates in which only 
fi rst-order variables are free. 8 
 Little as he says about truth, Frege says far less about the nature 
of falsity. A false thought is one that refers to  the False. Introducing 
his symbol for  the negation function in  Grundgesetze , he tells 
us:
 We need no special sign to declare a truth-value to be the False, so long as 
we possess a sign by which either truth-value is changed into the other. 9 
The thought here is that a sentence (or the thought it expresses) is 
false if, and only if, its negation is true. 10 
 2  Aboutness 
 Frege’s claim that sentences containing  non-referring singular terms 
are neither true nor false follows, in his eyes, from what I think of as 
Frege’s thesis about  aboutness :
 If words are used in the ordinary way, what one intends to speak of is their 
reference. (‘On sense and reference’, p. 159) 11 
There is an unambiguous statement of this thesis in the notes 
Carnap took at Frege’s lectures:
 A proper name has 
  1)  a meaning [reference]: the thing about which something is said; 
  2)  a sense that is part of the thought. 12 
  8  See Michael Dummett,  Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics (London: Duckworth, 
 1991 ), pp. 214–22, for a detailed analysis. 
  9  Gg , vol. I, §6 . 
 10  In §5 Frege has introduced the judgement stroke which indicates assertion, the 
acknowledgement of a thought as true. To say that no special sign is needed in the 
case of falsity is to say that acknowledgement of a thought as false can be effected 
by acknowledging its negation as true (and likewise the work done by denial can 
be accomplished by assertion of the negation). 
 11  I have silently restored ‘reference’ and its cognates for the translation of 
‘ Bedeutung ’ and the like here and in subsequent quotations. 
 12  E. Reck and S. Awodey (eds.),  Frege’s Lectures on Logic: Carnap’s Student Notes, 
1910–1914 (Chicago: Open Court, 2004), p. 148. 
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 Given that, there’s nothing a sentence containing a bearerless name 
is about, hence nothing for what it predicates to be true or false of. 
 Take a sentence containing a  Fregean proper name, i.e. either a 
proper name or a  defi nite description. Replace all occurrences of 
said name or description by some place-holding marker, say ‘ξ’. We 
have what Frege calls a ( fi rst-level) concept-word, an expression that 
refers to a concept . First-level concepts are functions from objects 
to truth-values. Going back to the original sentence, the Fregean 
proper name refers to an object, if it refers at all. If it refers, its refer-
ence is an argument of the function. If it refers, the sentence is true 
or false as the value of the function for that argument is the True 
or the False. If it does not refer, no argument is selected, hence the 
function takes no value: no input, no output. 13 
 This is what leads Frege to maintain that sentences containing 
bearerless proper names are neither true nor false. In a discussion of 
the name ‘Odysseus’, which he holds may be bearerless, he says,
 Is it possible that a sentence as a whole has only a sense, but no reference? 
At any rate, one might expect that such sentences occur, just as there are 
parts of sentences having sense but no reference. And sentences which con-
tain proper names without reference will be of this kind. The sentence 
‘Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep’ obviously has a 
sense. But since it is doubtful whether the name ‘Odysseus’, occurring 
therein, has reference, it is also doubtful whether the whole sentence has 
one. Yet it is certain, nevertheless, that anyone who seriously took the sen-
tence to be true or false would ascribe to the name ‘Odysseus’ a reference, 
not merely a sense; for it is of the reference of the name that the predicate 
is affirmed or denied. Whoever does not admit the name has reference can 
neither apply nor withhold the predicate. (‘On sense and reference’, p. 162) 
 In one published article from 1897, and in posthumously published 
writings dated 1897 and 1914 by the editors (although neither date 
may be reliable), the connection made between ‘aboutness’ and lack 
of truth-value is rendered quite transparently, this time with the 
name ‘Scylla’: 
 In poetry and legend … there occur sentences which, although they have 
a sense, have no reference – like, e.g., ‘Scylla has six heads’. This sentence 
 13  Cf. Susan Haack,  Philosophy of Logics (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press,  1978 ), p. 212; and Scott Lehmann, ‘Strict Fregean free logic’,  Journal of 
Philosophical Logic , 23 ( 1994 ), pp. 307–36. 
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is neither true nor false since, for it to be one or the other, it would have 
to have a reference; but no such reference is available, because the proper 
name ‘Scylla’ designates nothing. 14 
 The sentence ‘Scylla has six heads’ is not true, but the sentence ‘Scylla 
does not have six heads’ is not true either; for it to be true the proper name 
‘Scylla’ would have to designate something. (‘Logic’, pp. 129–30) 
 And when we say ‘Scylla has 6 heads’, what are we talking about? In 
this case nothing whatsoever; for the word ‘Scylla’ designates nothing. 
Nevertheless we can fi nd a thought expressed by the sentence, and con-
cede a sense to the word ‘Scylla’. 15 
Likewise, back with Odysseus, in the 1906 diary entries that form 
‘Introduction to Logic’:
 Proper names are meant to designate objects, and we call the object 
designated by a proper name its reference. On the other hand, a proper 
name is a constituent of a sentence, which expresses a thought. Now, 
what has the object got to do with the thought? We have seen from 
the sentence ‘Mont Blanc is over 4000 m high’ that it is not part of the 
thought. Is then the object necessary at all for the sentence to express 
a thought? People certainly say that Odysseus is not an historical per-
son, and mean by this contradictory expression that the name ‘Odysseus’ 
desi gnates nothing, has no reference. But if we accept this, we do not on 
that account deny a thought-content to all the sentences of the  Odyssey 
in which the name ‘Odysseus’ occurs. Let us just imagine that we have 
convinced ourselves, contrary to our former opinion, that the name 
‘Odysseus’, as it occurs in the  Odyssey , does designate a man after all. 
Would this mean that the sentences containing the name ‘Odysseus’ 
expressed different thoughts? I think not. The thoughts would strictly 
remain the same; they would only be transposed from the realm of fi c-
tion to that of truth. So the object designated by a proper name seems 
quite inessential to the thought-content of a sentence which contains it. 
To the thought-content! For the rest it goes without saying that it is by 
no means a matter of indifference to us whether we are operating in the 
realm of fi ction or of truth. 16 
 14  ‘On Mr Peano’s conceptual notation and my own’,  CP , p. 241. 
 15  ‘Logic in mathematics’,  PW , p. 225. 
 16  ‘Introduction to logic’,  PW , p. 191. I cite this lengthy passage in full because it 
is so very much at odds with the reading given by Gareth Evans,  The Varieties 
of Reference (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  1982 ), pp. 29–30) and by John 
McDowell (‘Truth-value gaps’, in McDowell,  Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality 
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 For Frege the truth-functional  logical connectives are literally 
functions (or, if you think of connectives as linguistic, refer to func-
tions). They are functions whose values are truth-values. For rea-
sons we shall briefl y examine below, Frege demands that functions 
defi ned for any objects be defi ned for all, so we cannot say that the 
connectives are functions whose arguments are truth-values; we 
can, however, say that it is only for arguments that are truth-values 
that we need to take note of the values they assign.  Negation maps 
the True to the False and the False to the True; conjunction maps 
the pair <the True, the True> to the True, the pair <the True, the 
False> to the False, and so on. As a consequence of this understand-
ing of the connectives, a sentence containing any sentential clause 
in a direct/non-oblique context that contains a bearerless proper 
name must lack a truth-value (must fail to refer). 
 3  The logical problem of bearerless names 
 Frege holds that  any sentence containing a bearerless name in a 
direct/non-oblique context is neither true nor false. That is the com-
pletely general thesis advanced in the quotation from ‘On sense and 
reference’. He terms the thought expressed by such a sentence ‘fi c-
titious’ and a  ‘mock thought’ (‘Logic’, p. 130); they are such exactly 
and only in that they fail to be about actually existing objects. In 
particular, he says
 ‘Scylla has six heads’ is not true 
and
 ‘Scylla does not have six heads’ is not true. 
 Lack of a bearer for a singular term spreads lack of truth-value per-
vasively to logically complex sentences. What holds for negation applies 
equally to the other familiar connectives. We can set out the Fregean 
picture in what look like truth-tables for three-valued logic: 17 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,  1999 ), pp. 212–13) to Frege’s talk of 
‘mock proper names’ and ‘mock thoughts’ in the 1897 piece ‘Logic’ as to encour-
age me in the belief that they have simply misread Frege. Cf . David Bell, ‘How 
“Russellian” was Frege?’,  Mind , 99 ( 1990 ), pp. 267–77, §4. 
 17  Cf. Timothy Smiley, ‘Sense without denotation’,  Analysis , 20 ( 1960 ), pp. 125–35. 
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 FREGEAN TRUTH TABLES 
 B  B 
 A ¬ A  A&B T  – F  A ∨ B T  – F
T F T T  – F T T  – T
 –  –  A  –  –  –  –  A  –  –  –  – 
F T F F  – F F T  – F
 B  B 
 A → B T  – F  A ↔ B T  – F
T T  – F T T  – F
 A  –  –  –  –  A  –  –  –  – 
F T  – T F F  – T
Beware! The bar is not a third truth-value; it signifi es the absence 
of a truth-value. Where both  A and  B have truth-values, the connec-
tives behave classically. 
 Lack of truth-value bothered Frege, his reason being that it sub-
verts  classical logic. 18 Going by the truth-tables above and taking 
for granted that a valid inference transmits truth from premises to 
conclusion, Frege was right to be bothered. Some familiar natural 
deduction rules fail:
 v-introduction, →-introduction (conditional proof),  reductio 
ad absurdum ,  ex falso quodlibet , the law of excluded middle. 
On the other hand, enough of classical logic survives for Frege to be 
in deep trouble, very deep trouble. Various classical equivalences 
still hold:
 P ↔  Q and ¬ P ↔ ¬ Q ; ¬¬ P and  P ; 
and we still have this rule:
 from  P ↔  Q and  Q ↔  R infer  P ↔  R . 
Albeit that numerous familiar rules fail to be uniformly truth-
preserving, there is a simple criterion of validity in this setting:
 the inference from premises Σ to conclusion φ is valid iff (i) it is classically 
valid and (ii) no proper name occurs in φ that does not occur in at least one 
member of Σ. 
 18  See, e.g., ‘Function and concept’,  CP , p. 148;  Gg, vol. II, §165. 
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There are two routes to trouble. The fi rst adopts (and adapts) an 
argument due to  Herbert Heidelberger. 19 
 The indirect argument 
 With the valid equivalences and the rule noted above in play, we 
can do this: 
 It’s true that  P if, and only if,  P 
 So, it’s not true that  P if, and only if, not- P 
 But it’s true that not- P if, and only if, not- P 
 And it’s true that not- P if, and only if, it’s false that  P 
 Hence it’s not true that  P (if, and) only if it is false that  P . 
And: 
 It’s false that  P if, and only if, it’s true that not- P 
 And it’s true that not- P if, and only if, not- P 
 So, it’s not false that  P if, and only if, not-not- P 
 Thus, it’s not false that  P if, and only if,  P 
 But it’s true that  P if, and only if,  P 
 Hence it’s not false that  P (if, and) only if it is true that  P . 
Putting that all together we get,
 It’s not true that  P and it’s not false that  P only if it’s both 
true that  P and false that  P . 
In short, everywhere we think there’s a  truth-value gap, there’s also 
a ‘glut’! (And  vice versa !) 
 In reaching this conclusion we have used a little logic and Frege’s 
claim about the sameness of thought expressed by  P and ‘It’s true 
that  P ’. Is the little logic used sound with respect to the Fregean 
truth-tables? Well, if  P is neither true nor false the biconditionals 
above are all neither true nor false. But that’s not really germane. 
What matters is that in asserting that a sentence containing a bear-
erless name is neither true nor false Frege surely intends to say 
 19  Herbert Heidelberger, ‘The indispensability of truth’,  American Philosophical 
Quarterly , 5 ( 1968 ), pp. 212–17. 
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something true: he asserts it, so, by his own lights has judged it to 
be true, not truth-value-less. Now, as the transitions licensed by the 
biconditionals above are truth-preserving (even if the bicondition-
als themselves are neither true nor false), we can indeed claim that 
there is a truth-preserving inference from the supposedly true
 It’s not true that  P and it’s not false that  P 
to the contradictory
 It is both true that  P and false that  P . 
The latter is certainly contradictory for it expresses the same 
thought as
 P and not- P . 
Heidelberger’s argument is perhaps not as well known as it should 
be. It’s not a knock-down argument that any theory that acknow-
ledges truth-value gaps must acknowledge all instances of gaps as 
being simultaneously instances of truth-value gluts. One needs to 
know what logical principles are in play. 20 In Frege’s case enough 
is in play to use at least a variant of the argument: the claim that 
a sentence containing a bearerless name is neither true nor false 
is contradictory, provably so even in a logic that allows for gaps as 
profl igate as those of the Fregean truth-tables. 
 The direct argument 
 A step taken in the course of the indirect argument suffices to estab-
lish the incoherence of Frege’s claims about sentences containing 
bearerless names and the thoughts they express. It is a step that 
 20  There are non-standard logics in which biconditionals do not contrapose (see, e.g., 
Richard Holton, ‘Minimalism and truth-value gaps’,  Philosophical Studies , 97 ( 2000 ), 
pp. 137–68, at pp. 154–5, for an application to present subject matter) and logics in 
which the negations of logically equivalent formulas need not be logically equivalent 
(such as Nelson’s Logic of Constructive Falsity and Priest’s Logic of Paradox). 
 The observation regarding biconditionals is something of a red herring. When 
we reconstruct the argument in terms of inferences, what matters is the rule of 
proof inversion (a weak form of  reductio ad absurdum ): if  A entails  B then not- B 
entails not- A . Now, true enough, this rule will not hold in general when bearer-
less names give rise to sentences that are neither true nor false, but the instances 
that we need do preserve truth-preservation. 
9780521624282c12_p465-508.indd   476 5/25/2010   5:44:56 PM
Frege’s folly 477
Frege ought to have considered, for it turns on the answer to the 
simple question, what is the difference between it’s not being true 
that  P and not- P ’s being true? For the Fregean there can be none.
  (1)  By the truth-equivalence,  P and ‘It’s true that  P ’ express the 
same thought. 
  (2)  By the functional understanding of negation, not- P and ‘It’s 
not true that  P ’ must therefore express the same thought. 
  (3)  By the truth-equivalence, not- P and ‘It’s true that not- P ’ 
express the same thought. 
  (4)  Therefore, ‘It’s not true that  P ’ and ‘It’s true that not- P ’ 
express the same thought. 
 Crispin Wright says, ‘[T]he equivalence schema entails, given only 
the most basic assumptions about its scope and about the logic 
of negation, that truth and negation commute as prefi xes’. 21 More 
narrowly, we have used only claims about sameness of meaning 
(thought expressed) to obtain the same conclusion. Frege wants ‘It’s 
not true that  P ’ to be  True when  P contains a bearerless name; and, 
at the same time, he wants ‘It’s true that  P ’ to say the same as  P 
(and ‘It’s true that not- P ’ to say the same as not- P ) even though, in 
virtue of containing a bearerless name,  P is, he wants to say,  not 
True and  not False . Now, the very fact that Frege tells us so little 
about falsity, and what he does tell us is exactly that judgement of a 
thought as false is accommodated by judging its negation to be true, 
shows us that he takes ‘It is false that  P ’ and ‘It’s true that not- P ’ as 
ways of expressing the same thought. But if he is right about this 
then he cannot coherently maintain of any thought that it is neither 
true nor false, for ‘It’s true that not- P ’ is entailed by, indeed  says the 
same as , ‘It’s not true that  P ’. 
 The following constitute an inconsistent triad (which we may 
call ‘Frege’s trilemma’):
  (i)  The truth-equivalence 
  (ii)  The functional reading of negation 
  (iii)  The truth-value gap thesis concerning the thoughts expressed 
by sentences containing bearerless names. 
 21  Wright, ‘Truth’, p. 213. 
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In the  Notes Dictated to G.E. Moore in Norway, April 1914 
 Wittgenstein states as a  defi nition :
 p is false = ~( p is true) Def. 22 
In a Tarskian, recursive defi nition of truth we standardly have the 
clause
 ~ p is true if, and only if,  p is not true. 
Such stipulations threaten not just the functional understanding of 
negation but bring pressure to bear on the very foundation of Frege’s 
function/argument analysis of propositions. For suppose  P has the 
form  F ( a ) where the name  a does not refer. Then  P ’s negation has the 
form ¬ F ( a ) and is true, since  P is not true. But the function denoted 
by ¬ F (ξ) does not, on its own, name either the True or the False, 
and yet  a supplies no argument for it. To avoid this consequence, it 
would seem that one must give up the functional understanding of 
the logical constants. 
 Otherwise, one must give up either the truth-equivalence or deny 
the existence of truth-value gaps. Michael Dummett gives up the 
former. 
 A Dummettian interlude 
 We have seen that (i), (ii) and (iii) are inconsistent. Dummett has 
argued that (i) and (iii) are inconsistent. The argument is given ori-
ginally in his article ‘Truth’. It has been endorsed by many. Simon 
Blackburn and Keith Simmons, in the Introduction to their collec-
tion,  Truth , rehearse it and wield it fi ercely without further ado. 
Richard Holton has said of it that it is as damaging as it is simple. 
It’s certainly simple. Here’s the argument:
 Suppose that  P contains a singular term which has a sense but no refer-
ence: then, according to Frege,  P expresses a proposition which has no 
truth-value. This proposition is therefore not true, and hence the statement 
 22  Ludwig Wittgenstein,  Notebooks 1914–1916 , ed. G. H. von Wright and G. E. M. 
Anscombe, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd edn (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), p. 116. 
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‘It is true that  P ’ will be false.  P will therefore not have the same sense as 
‘It is true that  P ’, since the latter is false while the former is not. 23 
 As it stands this argument is hardly compelling. It is an argu-
ment in the logician’s sense: it has premises; it has a conclusion. 
What connects them is a premise that Dummett has endorsed time 
and again: that  ‘It’s true that …’ is an  oratio obliqua context, 24 an 
oblique, opaque or indirect context. ‘It’s true that  P ’ is to be read 
as  predicating truth of the thought that is the reference of ‘That  P ’. 
There being no failures of reference in indirect contexts, ‘It’s true 
that  P ’ cannot be neither true nor false. 
 Dummett admits that the context governed by ‘It’s true that …’, 
unlike, say, propositional attitude contexts, fails the standard  sub-
stitution test for opacity. That test, however, he takes as being only 
a sufficient criterion. What is at stake here is the way we should 
read ‘It’s true that  P ’. As I have said, Dummett reads it as predicat-
ing truth of the thought referred to by the name ‘That  P ’. This is to 
be contrasted with how we read a sentence of the form ‘It is not the 
case that  P ’. Here ‘It’s not the case that …’ attaches,  as an operator 
to the sentence  P . 25 Why can we not read ‘It’s true that  P ’ analo-
gously (for surely ‘It is the case that …’ should be like  both ‘It is 
true that …’  and like ‘It is not the case that …’)? Before we come to 
Dummett’s response to that question let’s ask another. Does Frege 
concur with Dummett’s reading? 
 Nothing Frege says encourages the thought that he does. There 
are substantial reasons to think that he does not. Here’s one. The 
passages quoted from ‘On sense and reference’ that give us theses (i) 
and (iii) occur before any mention of oblique contexts (more prop-
erly, of the customary/indirect distinction for sense and reference). 
It would be disingenuous in the extreme, not to say outright dishon-
est, of Frege to use a locution that requires that distinction for its 
 23  Michael Dummett, ‘Truth’, in his  Truth and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 
1978), pp. 1–24. at p. 4. 
 24  E.g. ibid., Michael Dummett,  The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy  (London: 
Duckworth,  1981 ), ch. 6, and ‘Of what kind of a thing is truth a property?’, in 
S. Blackburn and K. Simmons (eds.),  Truth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), pp. 264–81. 
 25  Cf. A. N. Prior, ‘Oratio Obliqua’,  Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume , 37 
(1963), pp. 115–26, at p. 116, and ‘Is the concept of referential opacity really neces-
sary?’,  Acta Philosophica Fennica , 16 (1963), pp. 189–99, at pp. 193–4. 
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proper interpretation prior to advancing it, the more so as  nowhere 
does he ever so much as mention it as an example giving rise to 
an indirect context. Here’s another reason for thinking Frege didn’t 
adopt Dummett’s reading. Take a sentence such as ‘Jena is a city on 
the Saale’. The reference of the name ‘Jena’ is a particular German 
city. If the sentence is true then so too is the sentence ‘Jena exists’. 
Jena’s existence is an existential commitment of that sentence’s 
being true. On Dummett’s reading of ‘It’s true that Jena is a city 
on the Saale’, this second sentence has no such existential commit-
ments, or at least has none such directly, because in this sentence 
the name ‘Jena’ now refers to the customary sense expressed by the 
name ‘Jena’, the sense expressed in the original sentence, its indi-
rect reference. There is no obvious explanation why the truth of 
‘It’s true that Jena is a city on the Saale’ has the existential com-
mitments of ‘Jena is a city on the Saale’. Now, surely, Frege, had he 
intended Dummett’s reading, would have realized this and, having 
realized it, balked at the sameness of thought claim. 
 Frege does not, I contend, concur with Dummett’s reading. 
Should we? As I read him Dummett presents only one argument 
that is intended to clinch the claim that we should. 26 It is this:
 [I]f there are meaningful sentences which say nothing which is true or false, 
then there must be  a use of the word ‘true’ which applies to propositions; for 
 26  In ‘Of what kind of a thing is truth a property?’, he offers another which he 
describes as providing a strong reason in favour of the  oratio obliqua thesis. The 
argument form 
 X believes that  P 
 It’s true that  P 
 Therefore,  X has a true belief 
 is, as Dummett puts it, unquestionably valid. It is also, as he says, unproblematic 
if we read ‘It’s true that  P ’ as predicating truth of the proposition ‘That  P ’, i.e., the 
 oratio obliqua reading. It may, Dummett concedes, be objected that the form 
 X believes that  P 
 P 
 Therefore,  X has a true belief 
  is equally valid, but problematic on the view Dummett maintains. The difficulty can 
be ‘localized’ and validity explained by allowing inference of ‘It’s true that  P ’ from  P . 
But if this fact ‘provides strong reason for construing the phrase “it is true that” as 
inducing an opaque context’ (p. 271), it does so at the cost of rendering the validity of 
the latter inference wholly unexplained: to allow the inference is not to explain it. 
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if we say ‘It is neither true nor false that  P ’ the clause ‘that  P ’ must here be 
in  oratio oblique , otherwise the whole sentence would lack a truth-value. 27 
What reason could there be to believe this conclusion? I suspect 
that Dummett is making an assumption that we have already seen 
to be false on pain of contradiction  when the truth-equivalence is 
accepted : that if a sentence or thought  P is neither true nor false so 
too is its negation. The conclusion of the direct argument shows us 
that, if  P is neither true nor false, then, since in particular it is not 
true, its negation  is true. Without an assumption to the contrary in 
play, I cannot see how Dummett’s conclusion follows. To show that 
it does not we must elaborate a coherent position that admits that ‘It 
is neither true nor false that  P ’ is true for some sentences  P consist-
ently with the truth equivalence. 
 Before that, notice that, if Dummett is to avoid the same morass 
Frege got himself into, he must deny one of the following (what we 
might call ‘Dummett’s trilemma’):
  (i)  That  A entails ‘It’s true that  A ’ 
  (ii)  That not- B entails not- A when  A entails  B 
  (iii)  That ‘It’s true that not- A ’ entails ‘It’s false that  A ’. 
Here I take  entailment to be necessary truth-preservation. (i) and (ii) 
suffice to get from ‘It’s not true that  P ’ to ‘It’s true than not- P ’. 
 A semantic conception of falsity 
 The Fregean wants to say that an assertoric sentence may be neither 
true nor false. For this to be possible while endorsing the truth-
equivalence, he must  not , as we have seen, equate being false and 
not being true. If a sentence is not true that is either because it is 
false or because it is neither true nor false. Frege’s account of falsity, 
such as it is, fails to allow for this second possibility. 
 Dummett has argued that the truth-value gap thesis is incompat-
ible with Frege’s claim that  P and ‘It’s true that  P ’ express the same 
thought/content. I have suggested that Dummett’s grounds for this 
are not compelling. I do, nonetheless, hold that the truth-equivalence 
and the truth-value gap thesis are incompatible with Frege’s concep-
tion of how sentences come to be false, i.e., how they come to name 
 27  Dummett, ‘Truth’, p. 5. 
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the False. What we have been led to this far, via the direct argument, 
is an account of negation that assigns to it this truth-table: 




This is a three-valued truth-table in a purely formal sense: as before, 
‘ – ’ stands for neither true nor false, not for some distinct, third  value . 
 This is an unorthodox truth-table, one that follows from our 
Fregean theses (together with the commonplace that the negation 
of a truth is false), but one which there can be little doubt Frege 
failed to consider. Why so? Because  P ’s negation has a truth-value 
even when  P doesn’t. In Fregean terms, even when the assertoric 
sentence  P fails to refer either to the True or the False, because con-
taining a non-referring singular term, its negation, which contains 
exactly the same non-referring term or terms, succeeds in referring 
to the True. But  the negation operator, for Frege, stands for a func-
tion,  a function that maps the True to the False and everything else 
to the True (see, e.g., ‘Function and concept’, pp. 149–50,  Gg , vol. I, 
§6). It must, as all functions must according to Frege, be defi ned for 
all objects, but the whole point of the passage about Odysseus is that 
the sentence containing a non-referring term fails to refer, hence 
can supply no argument for the function for which negation stands 
to act upon. There is, as we have seen, a fundamental incoherence 
in Frege’s  use of negation in ‘On sense and reference’. 
 It is important to appreciate exactly which of Frege’s semantic 
theses poses the problem. It is  not the thought that  sentences are 
proper names referring to the True and the False if to anything, 
nor the thought, however problematic elsewhere, that the True and 
the False are objects on a par with tables, chairs and extensions of 
concepts. Nor is it the thought that logically unstructured  predi-
cates refer to concepts and the latter are functions from objects to 
truth-values. Nor yet is it a mere commitment to compositionality, 
at least as that is understood in contemporary terms, for there is 
no failure of compositionality in having a negation satisfying the 
truth-table above. Where the problem lies is in the supposition that 
 any sentence containing a non-referring singular term must itself 
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express a thought that fails to have a reference, i.e. fails to be either 
true or false. That thesis, entirely plausible taken on its own, no 
doubt, is incompatible with the conjunction of the truth equivalence 
and the truth-value gap thesis. Frege holds to this thesis because he 
has a narrow reading of compositionality in functional terms, from 
which follows the principle ‘no input, no output’. 28 
 Holding to the truth-equivalence, we must give up the claim 
that there are sentences expressing thoughts that are neither true 
nor false, or the thesis that  any assertoric sentence containing a 
non-referring singular term must express a thought that fails to 
be either true or false. The latter, of course entails the former, so 
that we cannot give the former up without rejecting the latter. The 
entailment does not reverse. What  is the case is that if we give up 
on the specifi cally Fregean thesis that any sentence containing a 
non-referring singular term must itself express a thought that fails 
to be either true or false, it may seem that we have little reason to 
continue endorsing the claim that there are sentences expressing 
thoughts that are neither true nor false. Why should the Fregean 
continue to suppose some sentences containing non-referring terms 
are neither true nor false when having to give up on the claim 
that all are? The best answer, it seems to me, is that anyone with 
Fregean sympathies would have to give up on the stronger thesis 
anyway, irrespective of any problems occasioned by his/her treat-
ment of negation. 29 
 28  Evans makes the weaker point that Frege had no means to rule out a ‘wide scope’ 
negation with our truth-table. But Evans makes a mistake when he goes on to say:
  I said this was essentially the same point, because it rests upon the incomprehen-
sibility of the idea that the thought that  p and the thought that  it is not true that 
p can both fail to be true. Surely the thought that it is not true that  p is true just 
when the thought that  p is not true. So resistance to the idea that both thoughts 
may fail to be true is, once again, resistance to the idea of a gap between a deter-
minate thought’s failing to have the value True and its having the value False. 
(Evans,  The Varieties of Reference , p. 25) 
  We agree that the thought that it is not true that  p is true just when the thought 
that  p is not true. But that, as we shall show, does not preclude the possibility of 
 p ’s being neither true nor false. 
 29  We should note that the weaker claim is compatible with what Frege lays down in 
 Grundgesetze in a section headed ‘When does a name denote something?’ There 
he says,
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 Our Fregean truth-tables for conjunction and disjunction have 
a quite extravagantly damaging effect on what Christine Tappolet 
calls truisms about truth. 30 To be fair, her one example – that a 
conjunction is true if, and only if, its conjuncts are true – survives; 
but the parallel truism for (inclusive) disjunction, that a disjunc-
tion is true if, and only if, at least one of its disjuncts is true, fails, 
as does the truism that a conjunction is false if, and only if, at least 
one of its conjuncts is false. Tappolet also proposes it as a truism 
that truth is what is conserved in valid inference. If so, with these 
truth-tables the natural deduction rule of ∨-introduction fails, as 
we noted above. If one supposes that, likewise, that it is a tru-
ism that if the conclusion of a valid inference is false so too is at 
least one premise – and is this any less of a truism? Perhaps it is – 
then the natural deduction rule of &-elimination (simplifi cation) 
also fails. 
 Now, of course, Frege did think that in order to save logic, by 
which he meant classical logic, a logically perfect language must 
satisfy the requirement that there be no non-referring singular 
terms, and that ordinary language is sadly defi cient in this respect. 
Anyone less sanguine than Frege about a wholesale revision of 
everyday conceptions in favour of the logically perfect, will, I sus-
pect, feel moved to hold on to Tappolet’s truisms and so reject the 
Fregean truth-tables for the sentences of everyday language. Rather, 
she will endorse these truth-tables: 
  A proper name has a denotation if the proper name that results from that proper 
name’s fi lling the argument places of a denoting name of a fi rst-level function 
of one argument  always has a denotation, and if the name of a fi rst-level func-
tion of one argument that results from the proper name in question’s fi lling the 
ξ-argument places of a denoting name of a fi rst-level function of two arguments 
 always has a denotation, and if the same holds also for the ζ-argument-places. 
( Gg , vol. I, §29, emphasis added) 
  He has preceded this by saying:
  A name of a fi rst-level function of one argument has a denotation (denotes some-
thing, succeeds in denoting) if the proper name that results from this function-
name by its argument-places being fi lled by a proper name always has a denotation 
if the name substituted names something. 
 30  Christine Tappolet, ‘Truth pluralism and many-valued logics: A reply to Beall’, 
 Philosophical Quarterly , 50 ( 2000 ), pp. 382–5. 
9780521624282c12_p465-508.indd   484 5/25/2010   5:44:57 PM
Frege’s folly 485
 NON-FREGEAN TRUISTIC TRUTH TABLES 
 B  B 
 A ¬ A  A&B T  – F  A∨B T  – F
T F T T  – F T T T T
 – T  A  –  –  – F  A  – T  –  – 
F T F F F F F T  – F
 B  B 
 A → B T  – F  A ↔ B T  – F
T T  – F T T  – F
 A  – T ?  –  A  –  – ?  – 
F T T T F F  – T
I put a ‘?’ rather than ‘ – ’ because one may well maintain that  any 
instance of  A →  A should be  True , but equally clearly not every 
sentence of the form  A →  B in which both  A and  B contain non-
referring proper names should be  True . Arguably it’s a truism that 
if  A entails  B then ‘If  A then  B ’ is true; and even more arguably, it’s 
a truism that  A entails  A . Likewise, if  A and  B say the same thing, 
‘If  A then  B ’ should be true. 31 
 At the same time as endorsing these truth-tables (which merely 
enshrine truisms), 32 we don’t have to give up entirely on the original 
Fregean perception that leads to the thesis that sentences contain-
ing non-referring singular terms are neither true nor false. 
 Think of simple predications. A predicate refers to a concept; some 
objects fall under the concept, some don’t. A predicate therefore just 
refers to something that maps objects to the  semantic values of sen-
tences, which, for Frege, are truth-values (as Dummett has empha-
sized: e.g.,  chapter 6 of  The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy ). 
And we need feel no obligation to say that a sentence comprising 
 31  Regarding truisms, it has to be admitted that in twentieth-century logic nothing 
is sacred. Quantum logic has been seen as admitting true disjunctions neither 
of whose disjuncts need be true. Even the rule of &-elimination (simplifi cation) 
has been denied: a conjunction may not entail its conjuncts (see, e.g . , Robert 
Gahringer, ‘Intensional conjunction’,  Mind , 79 ( 1970 ), pp. 259–60, and Bruce 
Thompson, ‘Why is conjunctive simplifi cation invalid?’,  Notre Dame Journal of 
Formal Logic , 32 ( 1991 ), pp. 248–54). 
 32  In the case of the conditional, conditionally so: if there’s any truth in the ma -
terial implication account of the conditional. 
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a simple predication and a non-referring singular term is anything 
other than neither true nor false. 
 We must divorce falsity and non-truth. We do this for atomic sen-
tences: for an atomic sentence to be false it must be not true  and all 
the singular terms it contains refer. Otherwise it is neither true nor 
false. Rather than an analogue of the simple truth equivalence, we 
then proceed to give a recursive defi nition of falsity, guided by the 
platitudes enshrined in the non-Fregean truth-tables. We must also 
give an account of the quantifi ers. The reader interested in seeing 
how this goes may consult the Appendix. 
 Now, it is a fact to be celebrated that, if we take Tappolet’s truism 
that truth is what is preserved in valid  inferences to heart, we fi nd 
that the (formal) truth-tables above for negation, conjunction and 
disjunction deliver that all and only classically valid propositional 
logic inference patterns involving those connectives preserve truth. 
Employing classically valid inference patterns in conjunction with 
the truth equivalence, we can then  derive the standard recursive 
clauses for truth concerning these connectives – accepting that ‘if 
 A then  B ’ is true when  A entails  B . What is more, we also have that 
an atomic sentence is neither true nor false when, and only when, 
at least one of its terms fails to refer. And, returning to Dummett’s 
discussion of ‘It’s true that …’ contexts, we fi nd that not only may 
the thought expressed by such a sentence be neither true nor false, 
it is then true that it is neither true nor false. 
 4  Statements of non-existence 
 To paraphrase  Leonard Linsky, Frege does not address the analysis of 
 negative existential sentences involving proper names, but we can 
construct a Fregean account of them. 33 Existence is a higher-level 
concept, under which concepts of lower level fall, or not: to say that 
there is at least one φ is to say that at least one object falls under the 
concept that is the reference of ‘φ’. To say that Jena exists is to say 
that at least one object falls under the concept  identical to Jena ; for-
mally, ∃ x ( x =  a ). To say that unicorns don’t exist is to say that noth-
ing falls under the concept  unicorn ; formally ¬∃ x ϕ x . Likewise, one 
 33  Leonard Linsky,  Names and Descriptions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
 1977 ), p. 5. 
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might expect, to say that Pegasus does not exist is to say that noth-
ing falls under the concept  identical to Pegasus . But this suggestion 
falls foul of Frege’s general thesis concerning sentences containing 
non-referring terms: the thought expressed, that Pegasus does not 
exist, is neither true nor false on Frege’s account. 34 
 It has struck some as intolerable that this should be a consequence 
of Frege’s theses on non-referring singular terms. Linsky, for example, 
says that ‘Pegasus does not exist’ is true, a truth, indeed, that we must 
insist upon. 35 Now, while common sense balks at  Meinong’s ‘There 
are objects of which it is true to say that there are no such objects’, it 
happily countenances assertions such as ‘There are lots of things that 
don’t exist: Atlantis, El Dorado, the planet Vulcan, Santa Claus, the 
Abominable Snowman, the Loch Ness Monster, the Big Grey Man of 
Ben Macdui …’ 36 But be that as it may, it hardly sanctions a refl ective 
insistence on the correctness of saying ‘Pegasus does not exist’. Of 
what is one denying existence? Not of Pegasus, for, as one would like 
to say, the point is that there is no Pegasus of which existence may be 
denied. There’s a real and pressing sense in which the sentence cannot 
be about Pegasus (even if, in some more attenuated sense of ‘about’, 
it is about Pegasus). The name ‘Pegasus’ does not refer; it  expresses a 
sense but nothing answers to this mode of presentation. 
 To say that Pegasus does not exist may, in some indirect way, 
be a claim about the name ‘Pegasus’ or the sense it expresses. The 
former is perhaps Frege’s view. The latter is Linsky’s contention. 
In negative existential sentences ‘exists’ ‘induces an  oblique con-
text in which the proper name denotes its customary sense’. 37 This 
is, he says, ‘a rather satisfying result since it exploits the intuition 
that existence-contexts are indeed special, and that what prevents 
 34  We have found Frege’s own account to be thoroughly unsatisfactory. We could 
with good conscience argue thus: as ‘Pegasus’ does not refer, ‘There is at least 
one object identical to Pegasus’ is not true; therefore its negation is true. For the 
time being I ask the reader to suspend her dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction sus-
pended, we note that the Fregean must say that the predicate ‘identical to Pegasus’ 
expresses a sense but fails to refer: no concept answers to the sense expressed. 
 35  Leonard Linsky, ‘Frege and Russell on vacuous singular terms’, in M. Schirn 
(ed.),  Studien zu Frege/Studies on Frege , vol. III (Stuttgart: Frommann,  1976 ), pp. 
97–115, at p. 112. 
 36  If to be is to be the value of a bound variable, existence comes cheap in ordinary 
usage. 
 37  Linsky,  Names and Descriptions, p. 6. 
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“Pegasus does not exist” from being meaningless is the fact that the 
denotationless name “Pegasus” is not devoid of sense’. 38 
 Whatever the merits of Linsky’s proposal, it has two signifi cant 
demerits. The fi rst is that in  classical logic the sentence ϕ a contain-
ing the singular term  a is logically equivalent to ¬∃ x ( x =  a & ¬ϕ x ). 
So either we junk  classical quantifi cation theory or thoughts about 
objects have the same truth-conditions (which may, for the Fregean, 
mean that they express the same thought) 39 as sentences about the 
modes of presentation of those objects. Neither is a happy place to 
end up. 
 The second demerit is that it fails to take account explicitly of 
what Frege says about existence presuppositions. In ‘On sense and 
reference’ we fi nd,
 If anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition that the 
simple or compound proper names used have a reference. If therefore one 
asserts ‘Kepler died in misery’, there is a presupposition that the name 
‘Kepler’ designates something; but it does not follow that the sense of 
 38  Linsky, ‘Frege and Russell’, p. 112. Linsky does not restrict the induction of 
oblique contexts by ‘exists’ to negative existentials. Some support for Linsky’s 
position might be drawn from Anthony Kenny’s observations:
 If a man uses a proper name, then he implies that it has a bearer, that is to say, that 
the object which he means exists. If someone says ‘Satan exists’ or ‘Satan does 
not exist’ then he does not imply, but respectively asserts or denies, that Satan 
exists. It follows that he is not using ‘Satan’ in these sentences as a proper name … 
[W]hether Satan exists or not, ‘Satan’ is not used as a proper name either in ‘Satan 
exists’ or in ‘Satan does not exist’. Neither of these sentences, moreover, is about 
Satan, whether or not he exists. (Anthony Kenny, : ‘Oratio Obliqua’,  Aristotelian 
Society Supplementary Volume , 37 ( 1963 ), pp. 127–146, at p. 141. 
  But why suppose it is existence statements that are special, why not the embed-
ded identity? It seemed to Bas van Fraassen that ‘we cannot plausibly reject that 
‘ t =  t ′’ is false when  t has a referent and  t ′ does not.’ He offers the example: that 
Santa Claus does not exist is sufficient reason to conclude that the president of the 
US is not Santa Claus (‘Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic’,  Journal of 
Philosophy , 63 ( 1966 ), pp. 481–95). 
 39  See  Gg , §32; ‘Compound thoughts’,  CP , pp. 393 and 405; Letter to Husserl, 
9 December, 1906,  PMC , pp. 70–1; ‘A brief survey of my logical doctrines’,  PW , 
p. 70; but see Charles Parsons, ‘Review article: Gottlob Frege  Wissenschaftlicher 
Briefswechsel’, Synthese , 52 ( 1982 ), pp. 325–43, at pp. 328–9, and Jean van 
Heijenoort, ‘Frege on sense identity’,  Journal of Philosophical Logic , 6 ( 1977 ), 
pp. 103–8. 
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the sentence ‘Kepler died in misery’ contains the thought that the name 
‘Kepler’ designates something. If this were the case the negation would 
have to run not 
 Kepler did not die in misery 
 but 
 Kepler did not die in misery, or the name ‘Kepler’ has no 
reference. 
 That the name ‘Kepler’ designates something is just as much a 
presupposition for the assertion 
 Kepler died in misery 
 as for the contrary assertion. Now languages have the fault of containing 
expressions which fail to designate an object (although the grammatical 
form seems to qualify them for that purpose) because the truth of some 
sentence is a prerequisite. (‘On sense and reference’, pp. 168–9) 
It is, then, a presupposition of the sentence ‘Pegasus does not 
exist’ that the name ‘Pegasus’ designate something, and hence 
that ‘Pegasus exists’ is true. Thus the sentence ‘Pegasus does not 
exist’ cannot be (truthfully) asserted: one cannot acknowledge it as 
true for in the very attempt to do so one must accept its contrary. 
Frege’s observation concerning negations of sentences containing 
singular terms is correct to the extent that we do not normally 
make  explicit existence assumptions when we negate a sentence. 
(Russell’s theory of descriptions is a case in which the distinc-
tion between wide and narrow scope negations is in this respect 
abnormal.) 
 Taking the observation at face value, Frege has a strong motive 
for insisting, as he does on numerous occasions, that in a perfected 
scientifi c language every properly constructed (closed) singular 
term refers, for only then is it the case that the language is used in 
accordance with the presuppositions of (its) correct usage. We can 
see from the way we say what the  negation (or, more generally, the 
contrary) of a given sentence says that we take for granted that the 
proper names of our language refer. It is, then, no surprise if we run 
into difficulties when those presuppositions fail. Frege, never being 
one to cast doubt on the correctness of classical logic, takes the pre-
suppositions as well founded. A language rid of imperfections must 
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accord with those presuppositions: well-formed proper names of the 
language must – as a matter of logic! – refer. 
 5  The perfected langauge of a 
demonstrative science 
 If we are to use a language in accord with the presuppositions for its 
use,  all singular terms of the langauge must refer:
 A logically perfect language ( Begriffsschrift ) should satisfy the conditions, 
that every expression grammatically well constructed as a proper name 
out of signs already introduced shall in fact designate an object, and that 
no new sign shall be introduced as a proper name without being secured a 
reference. (‘On sense and reference’, p. 169) 
 As Frege indicates here, there are general methods for forming 
proper names; all such names must be assured of a reference. The 
best known  variable-binding term-forming operators (vbtos) gener-
ate defi nite descriptions and set abstracts. Let α be a vbto. Then, 
for any predicate ϕ( x ), α x ϕ( x ) is a singular term (in Frege’s terminol-
ogy: a proper name). 
 In  Grundgesetze , terms for courses-of-values are introduced this 
way (in the notation Φε) ( Gg , §9). 40 What Frege calls his ‘substitute 
for the defi nite article’ is introduced a little differently, as a function 
mapping objects to objects: 
 if ξ = (ε = ∆), for some object ∆ then    ξ = ∆; 
 otherwise     ξ = ξ. ( Gg , §§11 and 31) 41 
 The only objects Frege has previously introduced are the two truth-
values, the True and the False, and courses-of-values. In §10 he has 
argued that the True and the False may be identifi ed with courses-
of-values. The net effect is therefore the same as introducing a vbto 
meeting these constraints: 
 40  It is tempting to put ‘{ x : φ( x )}’, in a more modern notation, for Frege’s ‘Φε’ but 
that, while largely harmless, would be misleading in that Frege’s extension of 
a concept is closer to the graph of a set’s characteristic function than to the set 
itself. 
 41  Frege’s Basic Law VI says only: ∀ x ( x =    (ε =  x )). That is, the Law says  nothing about 
how     ξ is to be interpreted when ξ is not of the form (ε = ∆) for some properly 
formed name ∆. 
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 if a unique object falls under the concept ϕ(ξ) then ‘ x ϕ( x )’ 
denotes that object; 
 otherwise ‘ x ϕ( x )’ denotes φε. 
From the Fregean perspective, vbtos are second-level functions map-
ping concepts to objects. Like all functions, they must be defi ned 
for all possible arguments – all concepts – and they must be well 
defi ned, that is, the function must assign the same object to co-
extensive concepts, for co-extension is the analogue for concepts of 
identity between objects. In the Fregean scheme, the vbto α satisfi es 
these two axioms, where we read the second-order quantifi ers as 
quantifying over concepts: 
 α-Existence: ∀ X ∃z(z = α yXy ); 
 α-Extensionality: ∀ X ∀ Y (∀ x ( Xx ↔  Yx ) → α yXy = α yYy ). 
We should note that these are trivially consistent with respect to 
standard second-order semantics, for we may take a one-element 
domain,  D = {0}, and a function  a :℘( D ) →  D which assigns 0 to both 
subsets of  D . We should note too that, as George Boolos observed, 
α-Extensionality may be considered a logical truth: given extensional 
semantics, α is interpreted as a function from subsets of the domain 
to the domain and ∀ x ( Xx ↔  Yx ) is satisfi ed under an assignment 
of values to the second-order variables if, and only if,  X and  Y are 
assigned the same subset of the domain. 42 Lastly, we should note 
that in standard second-order logic α-Existence is a consequence of 
α-Extensionality as ∀ X ∀ x ( Xx ↔  Xx ) is a logical truth. 
 6  Basic Law V 
 Introducing courses-of-values, in §3 of  Grundgesetze , Frege says 
 I use the words 
 ‘the function Φ(ξ) has the same  course-of-values as the function Ψ(ξ)’ 
 generally to denote the same as the words 
 ‘the functions Φ(ξ) and Ψ(ξ) have always the same value for the same 
argument’. 
 42  George Boolos, ‘Frege’s theorem and the Peano postulates’,  The Bulletin of 
Symbolic Logic , 1 ( 1995 ), pp. 317–26, at p. 322. 
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This is Basic Law V informally stated. There is further discussion of 
courses-of-values in §§9 and 10, and a formal statement in §20. Later 
on he splits the law into Va and Vb. Va is α-Extensionality for the 
extension-of-concept vbto . It is unexceptionable. As Montgomery 
 Furth says, ‘This is no news to us; it merely follows from the exten-
sionality of concepts’. 43 Vb is the converse of Va.
 Converse of α-Extensionality: ∀ X ∀ Y (α yXy = α yYy → ∀ x ( Xx ↔  Yx )). 
This says that the vbto α stands for a one–one function from con-
cepts to objects. 
 7.  Cantor’s Theorem 
 In the 1890–1 volume, the fi rst volume, of the  Jahresbericht der 
deutschen Mathematiker-Vereinigung Cantor published a proof 
of what is now widely known 44 as Cantor’s Theorem: every set is 
of lower cardinality than the set of its subsets. Emphasizing its 
pertinence to Fregean concerns, we note that Cantor’s original 
proof was phased not directly in terms of subsets but in terms 
of functions defi ned on a given set and taking only two values 
(0 and 1). 45 
 Cantor’s theorem can be phrased in two equivalent ways:
  (1)  There is no function from a set  X onto the set of all its 
subsets. 
  (2)  There is no one–one function from the set of all subsets of  X 
into the set  X . 
The orthodox textbook proof of Cantor’s Theorem, following 
Cantor’s original, is a proof of (1). 
 43  Montgomery Furth, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in Frege,  The Basic Laws of 
Arithmetic; Exposition of the System , ed. and trans. M. Furth (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), pp. xlv–xlvi. 
 44  Ernst Zermelo, ‘Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I’, 
 Mathematische Annalen , 65 ( 1908 ), pp. 261–81, translated as ‘Investigations in 
the foundations of set theory I’ in J. van Heijenoort (ed.),  From Frege to Gödel: A 
Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1967), pp. 199–215. 
 45  Cantor’s proof is reproduced in Michael Hallett,  Cantorian Set Theory and 
Limitation of Size (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 77. 
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 Let  f be a function from  X into the set of all subsets of  X . 
The set  Y = { x ∈  X :  x ∉ f ( x )} is a well-defi ned subset of  X . 
But no element of  X is mapped to  Y by  f . For suppose, to 
the contrary, that  f ( y ) =  Y ; we ask, Does  y belong to  f ( y )? If 
 y ∈ f ( y ),  i.e. if  y ∈  Y , then, by the defi nition of  Y ,  y ∉ f ( y ); 
conversely, however, if  y ∉ f ( y ) then  y meets the defi ning 
condition for membership of  Y and so  y ∈ Y , i.e.  y ∈ f ( y ). 
Thus  y ∈ f ( y ) if, and only if,  y ∉ f ( y ) – a contradiction. 
With a proof of (1) in hand, (2) may quickly be derived via a proof by 
contradiction. 
 Suppose that there is a one–one function  h from ℘( X ) 
into  X . As it is one–one it has an inverse: for any  x in 
 X , there is at most one subset of  X mapped to  x by  h . 
The inverse maps some not necessarily proper subset  Y 
of  X onto ℘( X ). Pick an arbitrary subset of  X and map 
any remaining members of  X – those not in  Y – to that 
subset. We then have a function from  X onto ℘( X ), in 
contradiction to (1). 
For present purposes it is of more interest to prove (2) directly. We 
do this twice over. 
 Let  g be a function from ℘( X ) into  X . Let  Y be the subset 
{ x ∈ X : ∃Z ⊆  X [ x =  g ( Z ) and  x ∉ Z ]}, a well-defi ned subset of 
 X . Let  y =  g ( Y ). 
 I A If  y ∉ Y then  y satisfi es the condition for membership of 
 Y ,  i.e. y ∈ Y . This suffices to establish that  y ∈ Y . 
 I B But now, think what this,  i.e. y ∈ Y , says. On the one 
hand,  y =  g ( Y ) and  y ∈ Y . On the other, for some subset  Z of 
 X ,  y =  g ( Z ) and  y ∉ Z . Thus  g is not one-one as two distinct 
subsets of  X are mapped to  y . 
 II A Suppose that  g is one–one and that  y ∈ Y . For some  Z , 
 y =  g ( Z ) and  y ∉ Z . But as  g is one-one,  Z =  Y . So, if  y ∈ Y 
then  y ∉ Y . This establishes that  y ∉ Y . 
 II B But think what this says: for any subset  Z of  X that 
gets mapped to  y by  g ,  y is a member of  Z . But  Y is one 
such and  y , as just demonstrated, is not a member of it. 
Contradiction. –  g cannot be one–one. 
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 We have here  three proofs: I A + I B ; II A + II B ; and I A + II A , for the latter 
two give us, respectively,  y ∈  Y and  y ∉ Y , a contradiction, on the 
assumption that  g is one–one. 
 To bring out the role of the clause ‘ Y is a well-defi ned subset of  X ’, 
here’s a neat little exercise in set theory: 
 The co-fi nite subsets of N are those subsets of N whose 
complements with respect to N are fi nite. The set of all 
fi nite and co-fi nite subsets of N is countably infi nite. Let 
 X 0 ,  X 1 , …,  X  n  , … be some enumeration of this set. Show 
that the set 
 Y = { n ∈ N:  n ∈  X  n  } 
 is neither fi nite nor co-fi nite. 
 Proof Consider the complement of  Y , N –  Y = { n ∈ N:  n ∉ 
 X  n  }, which is fi nite or co-fi nite as  Y is co-fi nite or fi nite. If 
it is either fi nite or co-fi nite then N – Y =  X  m  , for some 
 m ∈ N. But then,  m ∈  X  m  if and only if  m ∈ N – Y if and 
only if m ∉  X  m  . 
So N – Y, and hence  Y itself, is neither fi nite nor co-fi nite. 
 The point is that here we can have a one–one correspondence 
between N and the family of fi nite and co-fi nite subsets of N, 
exactly because the ‘diagonalizing set’ N –  Y doesn’t belong to that 
family. 
 Cantor’s Theorem, published at around the time Frege was fi n-
ishing the writing of the fi rst volume of  Grundgesetze , provides a 
stark warning. Sadly, it was a warning to which Frege was blind. 
 8  The paradox 
 With a vbto α in our (second-order) language, we may form the pred-
icate containing one free variable 
 ∃X(x = α yXy & ¬ Xx ), 
 which we shall abbreviate as Ψ( x ). On the assumption that it is a suit-
able substituend for the second-order quantifi ers,  i.e. on the assump-
tion that this predicate does refer to a concept, we can show, as a 
matter of logic, that Ψ(α y Ψ( y )). We shall conduct the proof in a weak 
second-order free logic, so that we explicitly mark assumptions that 
9780521624282c12_p465-508.indd   494 5/25/2010   5:44:59 PM
Frege’s folly 495
a formula is an appropriate substitution instance for a quantifi er – 
semantically, that a formula does refer to an entity falling within 
the range of the quantifi ers, be that at fi rst- or second-order. 46 We 
take the natural deduction rules for quantifi ers and identity in free 
logic from  Tennant. 47 The proof looks like this: 
 ————–  1  —––   1
∀X∃z(z = αyXy) ∃!ψ t = αyψ(y)  ∃!t
—————————– ∀2-E ————————  = -E









   ¬ψ(αyψ( y))
—————————————————–———  &-I
αyψ(y) = αyψ(y) & ¬ψ(αyψ(y)) ∃ψ 
——————————————————————— ∃2-I





 46  Stewart Shapiro and Alan Weir, ‘“Neo-Logicist” logic is not innocent’,  Philosophia 
Mathematica , 8 (2000), §§IV and V, pp. 160–89, use free logic at fi rst order but not 
second. 
 47  Neil Tennant,  Natural Logic (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,  1978 ), 
pp. 167–8. Tennant takes (the fi rst-order) ∃! a as an abbreviation for ∃ x ( x =  a ). One 
need not, for the rules for the quantifi ers and identity allow one to prove their 
logical equivalence. In the present setting, in which we have taken over the rules 
at second order too, and in which the signifi cance of ‘∃!φ’ has yet to be fully 
worked out, it is best that we take ∃! as primitive. 
From α-Existence and the referential assumption ∃!Ψ – that the 
predicate ∃X(x = α yXy & ¬ Xx ) refers to a concept – we have derived 
Ψ(α x Ψ( x )). Only the last step, an application of a weak form of clas-
sical  reductio ad absurdum , is essentially classical. 
 This proof is a natural deduction free-logic variation on the proof 
Frege himself gives in the Appendix to Volume II of  Grundgesetze . 
He then goes on to parallel step I B above. He summarizes the 
result:
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 In other words: for every second-level function of one argument of type 2 
there are two concepts such that, taken as arguments of this function, they 
determine the same value, but also such that this value does fall under the 
fi rst concept and does not fall under the second. ( Gg II, Appendix) 
As Frege realizes only too well, the result is quite general: it holds 
for any vbto α in the extensional/Fregean framework. 48 
 We can give a formal version of the proof II A . It’s more involved – 
see next page – but, as we shall see shortly, there is a point to con-
sidering the I A + II A proof of Cantor’s Theorem. 
 Making explicit the assumption that the predicate ∃X(x = α yXy & 
¬ Xx ), which we have abbreviated Ψ( x ), refers to a concept, what the 
formal proofs give us is: 
 (i) α-Existence + ∃!Ψ ⊢ Ψ(α x Ψ( x )); 
 (ii)  α-Existence + Converse of α-Extensionality + ∃!Ψ ⊢ 
¬Ψ(α x Ψ( x )). 
Hence the combination of α-Existence, Converse of α-Extensionality, 
and the assumption that the predicate ∃X(x = α yXy & ¬ Xx ) refers to 
a concept is inconsistent. 49 Moreover, in view of the publication of 
Cantor’s Theorem in 1890, this inconsistency was foreseeable. 50 
 48  Famously, in ‘On concept and object’, Frege tells us that ‘the concept  horse ’, being 
complete or saturated, names an object, not a concept. The expression ‘The con-
cept’ is therefore a vbto. It requires rather strong Fregean nerves then to counte-
nance that there must be two concepts, φ(ξ) and χ(ξ), such that 
 the concept φ = the concept χ 
  but the object that we may variously refer to as ‘the concept φ’ or ‘the concept χ’ 
falls under one of these concepts but not the other. If, as seems plausible, we take 
it that ‘the concept φ’ names the extension of the concept φ – see Tyler Burge, 
‘Frege on extensions of concepts, from 1884 to 1903’, in Burge,  Truth, Thought, 
Reason: Essays on Frege (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005), pp. 273–98, at pp. 283–4 – 
this is, of course, merely a restatement of the application that led Frege to rethink 
extensions in the Appendix to volume II of  Grundgesetze . 
 49  The use of second-order quantifi cation in obtaining the contradiction is essen-
tial. It is known that the (standard, hence also the free) fi rst-order fragment of the 
system of  Grundgesetze is consistent. See Terence Parsons, ‘On the consistency 
of the fi rst-order portion of Frege’s logical system’,  Notre Dame Journal of Formal 
Logic , 28 ( 1987 ), pp. 161–8. 
 50  As J. N. Crossley points out (‘A note on Cantor’s Theorem and Russell’s paradox’, 
 Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 51 ( 1973 ), pp. 70–1, at p. 71), a derivation 
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 Foreseeable, not foreseen.  John Burgess offers this account:
 The explanation is  not that Frege rejected Cantor’s results. A sufficient 
explanation is that Frege (like so many others) was largely  unaware of 
the bearing of Cantor’s cardinality theorems on the issues that con-
cerned him. If he had pondered that bearing, he would surely have 
begun by translating Cantorian jargon into Fregean jargon. He would 
then immediately have seen that the Cantorian greater cardinality the-
orem says that there are more Fregean ‘concepts’ than Fregean ‘objects’. 
He would then immediately have seen that this contradicts an axiom of 
the Fregean system, according to which there is a distinct ‘object’ asso-
ciated with each ‘concept,’ namely, the ‘class’ that is its ‘extension.’ He 
would then surely have gone on to ponder whether or not the Cantorian 
proof can be reproduced within the Fregean system. He would then 
surely have seen that it can, and would thus have seen that his system 
is inconsistent. 51 
 What adds pathos is that in his review of Frege’s  Grundlagen in 
1885,  Cantor had warned against taking extensions of concepts as 
the building blocks. Cantor already held then that there could be 
no set of all sets. Opinions divide on whether Cantor’s warning was 
obscurely put or Frege simply negligent in, apparently, failing to 
understand it. 52  
of Russell’s paradox is easily obtained from Cantor’s proof of his theorem: if 
we take the domain of all sets to be, itself, a set, then, for that set  V , we must 
have that ℘ ( V ) is  V itself, for, on the one hand, all sets are contained in  V , and, 
on the other, every set is a subset of  V (as all its members are sets), and hence 
that the identity function is,  per impossibile , a function from  V onto the set of 
all its subsets. The set one then constructs in the course of Cantor’s proof that 
there is no such function is the set { x ∈  V :  x ∉ x }, the Russell set. But by 1890 
Cantor knew that the collection of all sets was, in the terminology he would 
later use, an absolutely infi nite and inconsistent multiplicity, so he would not 
have carried out this application of his proof. (See Michael Hallett,  Cantorian 
Set Theory and Limitation of Size (Oxford: Oxford University Press,  1984 ), 
chs. 1 and 4. 
 51  John P. Burgess, ‘Frege and arbitrary functions’, in W. Demopoulos (ed.),  Frege’s 
Philosophy of Mathematics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,  1995 ), 
pp. 89–107, at pp. 101–2. 
 52  Contrast Hallett,  Cantorian Set Theory , pp. 126–7, and W. W. Tait, ‘Frege versus 
Cantor and Dedekind: On the concept of number’, in Tait (ed.),  Early Analytic 
Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein (Chicago: Open Court,  1997 ), pp. 213–48, 
esp. §12. 
9780521624282c12_p465-508.indd   498 5/25/2010   5:45:00 PM
Frege’s folly 499
 9.  Ways out, explored and unexplored 
 In recent years much highly productive effort has been spent in 
exploring weakened versions of Frege’s theory. 53 What concerns me 
here is what responses were open to Frege in the light of his philoso-
phy in the years from 1890 to Russell’s delivery of his bombshell. It 
seems to me that there are two responses open to Frege, neither of 
which is there any evidence he considered. 
 The fi rst is prompted by our having made the  concept-existence 
assumption explicit in using a free-logic framework in deriving 
inconsistency. So one can read the proof as showing that α-Existence 
and Converse of α-Extensionality jointly entail that the predicate 
∃X(x = α yXy & ¬ Xx ) does not refer to a concept. Formally, it is quite 
consistent to take that line, for in free logic, where the existence 
presuppositions of classical logic fi gure as  refutable assumptions, 
α-Existence, α-Extensionality, and Converse of α-Extensionality are 
consistent. The little set-theoretic exercise with fi nite and co-fi nite 
sets shows this: take the domain to be the set of natural numbers, 
take concepts to be fi nite and co-fi nite subsets of that domain and, 
under some enumeration of the fi nite and co-fi nite subsets, take 
α x φ( x ) to be the index of the set to which φ is mapped (and similarly 
for assignments of concepts to the second-order variables). 
 Under what conditions does a predicate not refer to a concept? 
In  Grundgesetze Frege is quite explicit on this: φ(ξ) denotes a func-
tion (concept) if, whenever ‘ξ’ is replaced by a name that denotes, 
the resulting sentence denotes (§§29 and 31). In volume II of 
 Grundgesetze we get something perhaps a little different:
 Any object ∆ that you choose to take either falls under the concept Ψ or 
does not fall under it;  tertium non datur . ( Gg II, §56) 54 
 53  See the papers collected in §§II and III of Demopoulos,  Frege’s Philosophy of 
Mathematics , and John P. Burgess,  Fixing Frege (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press,  2005 .) 
 54  Frege seems to be skittering between objectual and substitutional readings of 
his quantifi ers. On Frege’s reading of quantifi ers see Leslie Stevenson, ‘Frege’s 
two defi nitions of quantifi cation’,  Philosophical Quarterly , 23 ( 1973 ), pp. 207–23, 
which goes some way to explaining why objectual and substitutional readings 
may not be so far apart for Frege. At this point it is fi rst-order quantifi ers that 
concern us. Dummett remarks that at second order Frege’s ‘formulations make 
it likely that he thought of his function-variables as ranging only over those 
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Immediately before this Frege says, 
 The law of excluded middle is really just another form of the requirement 
that the concept have a sharp boundary. 
 A  concept without sharp boundary is, he says, ‘wrongly termed a 
concept’. There are other places in his writings where Frege makes 
similar stipulations. 55 We now see how to read our marker for the 
second-order existence assumption in our proof of contradiction:
 ‘∃!Ψ’ means ∀ x (Ψ( x ) ∨¬Ψ( x )). 
Of course, if the Law of Excluded Middle is part of our free logic, 
this does no good. More precisely, we would have that α-Existence 
and the Converse of α-Extensionality are inconsistent in a second-
order classical free logic. But to have the Law of Excluded Middle 
as part of our logic wouldn’t be to play the game, if we wish to 
turn existence presuppositions into explicitly formulated existence 
assumptions. 56 
 Our proof of ¬Ψ(α y Ψ( y )) from α-Existence, Converse of 
α-Extensionality and ∃!Ψ uses no essentially classical rule. Not so 
our proof of Ψ(α x Ψ( x )) from α-Existence and ∃!Ψ; it uses classical 
 reductio ad absurdum . But it uses it only once, as the last step in 
the proof. Instead we could use  reductio ad absurdum to obtain a 
proof of ¬¬Ψ(α x Ψ( x )), which suffices for obtaining a contradiction 
from α-Existence, Converse of α-Extensionality and ∃!Ψ, the latter 
now construed as ∀ x (Ψ( x ) ∨¬Ψ( x )). 
 In this setting we read our proof as a proof of 
 ¬∀ x (∃X(x = α yXy & ¬ Xx ) ∨¬∃X( x = α yXy & ¬ Xx )). 
 The predicate ∃X(x = α yXy & ¬ Xx ) cannot, on pain of contra-
diction, denote a concept. As our α-Existence claim is confi ned to 
functions that could be referred to by functional expressions of his symbolism’ 
(Dummett,  Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics, p. 220). 
 55  ‘Function and concept’, p. 148; ‘The argument for my stricter canons of defi ni-
tion’,  PW , p. 152; ‘Logic in mathematics’, pp. 229, 241, 243. 
 56  Frege considers, but rejects, failure of the Law of Excluded Middle. He does so 
because he sees its failure as indicating that extensions of concepts would not 
be proper objects. He does not consider that the fault could lie with the predicate 
used. (See the Appendix to  Gg, vol. II.) 
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concepts, it does not apply to this predicate – this predicate is not an 
allowed substituend – and the known route to paradox is blocked. 
 Can anything more general be said? In fi rst-order intuitionist 
logic, ¬∀ x (φ x ∨ ¬ϕ x ) is formally consistent (although ∃ x ¬(ϕ x ∨¬ϕ x ) 
is not). Now, our current reading of ∃! limits the range of the second-
order quantifi ers to what, in intuitionist terms, are decidable prop-
erties.  If the predicate ∃ X ( x = α yXy & ¬ Xx ) denotes a decidable prop-
erty, paradox ensues. But even though the variable  X ranges over 
decidable properties, it is not immediately evident that ∃X(x = α yXy 
& ¬ Xx ) is itself decidable. Providing a semantic model in which the 
denotation of ∃ X ( x = α yXy & ¬ Xx ) falls outside the range of second-
order quantifi ers appropriately limited in range so as to secure truth 
of ∀ X ∀ x ( Xx ∨¬ Xx ) turns upon fi ne points in the interpretation of 
second-order quantifi ers in the model-theory of second-order intui-
tionist logic. One thought against decidability of ∃ X ( x = α yXy & ¬ Xx ) 
would be that, just as the domain of individuals can increase from 
lesser to greater states of information (earlier to later nodes) in 
Kripke models for fi rst-order intuitionist logic, so too can the range 
of the second-order quantifi ers when we make the move to second 
order: as information increases one learns of new decidable proper-
ties (or learns of old ones that they are decidable). 
 All of this may seem, even if feasible, desperately ad hoc. All I 
wish to claim for it is that it has its roots in Frege’s pre-paradox 
writings. 
 A second route is also licensed by those writings, and perhaps 
more so than Frege realized. Consider, for a moment, Frege’s stipula-
tions regarding his surrogate for defi nite descriptions. The surrogate 
behaves as it should when exactly one object falls under the concept 
used in constructing the description: it denotes that object. When 
less than or more than one object falls under the concept, it denotes 
the extension of the concept.  This isn’t a matter of getting anything 
right: it’s just a stipulation that ensures description-terms always 
have a reference. The same attitude is to the fore when, in ‘Function 
and concept’, Frege says that we must ‘lay down rules from which 
it follows, e.g., what “ + 1” is to mean, if “” refers to the Sun’ 
(‘Function and concept’, p. 148). He follows this injunction with 
the comment, ‘What rules we lay down is a matter of comparative 
indifference.’ In principle it is open to Frege to behave just as cava-
lierly in the case when it is determined that a predicate does not 
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pick out an extension, cases of the kind Cantor was well aware of, 
cases of the kind that emerged from Cantor’s, Russell’s and Burali-
Forti’s paradoxes. In a logically perfect language, set-abstract terms 
that  seem to pick out those ‘impossible sets’ must be assigned some 
reference, but need not denote extensions of the predicates occur-
ring in them. Basic Law Vb then needs to be qualifi ed. It prescribes 
‘normal behaviour’, when set-abstracts do refer to, so to say, the 
right extensions. ‘Abnormal’ predicates may be assigned the same 
extension even though not co-extensive – we know there must be 
some predicates for which this happens. The problem with such an 
approach is in determining the range of the ‘abnormal’. (This is not 
to say that the ‘abnormal’ cases must be explicitly taken care of in 
the revised basic law: compare Basic Law VI, which describes only 
the well-behaved cases for defi nite descriptions.) 
 This too was not the way Frege chose to go. Because of the con-
structive role played by extensions of concepts in both  Grundlagen 
and  Grundgesetze , Frege took the route of rethinking the very 
notion of  extension of a concept in the light of the very gen-
eral result he obtained in the Appendix to the second volume of 
 Grundgesetze : some concepts must have the same extension even 
though not being co-extensive. It may be true that ‘the function 
Φ(ξ) has the same course-of-values as the function Ψ(ξ)’ even though 
it is not the case that ‘the functions Φ(ξ) and Ψ(ξ) have always the 
same value for the same argument’. Frege made the minimal change 
possible in the light of how he came to that discovery. The only 
problematic examples he knew of being obtained from ∃ X ( x = α yXy 
& ¬ Xx ) and ∀ X ( x = α yXy → ¬ Xx ), he proposed that two concepts Φ(ξ) 
and Ψ(ξ) have the same extension if, and only if, the functions Φ(ξ) 
and Ψ(ξ) have always the same value for the same argument save 
with the possible exceptions of the object that is their common 
extension. 
 It is known that Frege’s specifi c proposal fails to avoid paradox (as 
recognized by Lesniewski, Geach and Quine). 57 Dummett says,
 57  See Gregory Landini, ‘The ins and outs of Frege’s way out’,  Philosophia 
Mathematica , 14 ( 2006 ), pp. 1–25 for a recent, and somewhat wayward, discus-
sion. One enterprise that has attracted a small following away from the main-
stream of Frege scholarship is the investigation of something akin to Frege’s 
system in weak logics. The naive comprehension principle (roughly, α-Existence 
for set abstracts) is known to be consistent in certain weak logics. It is also known 
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 The inconsistency of Frege’s  Grundgesetze system was not a mere accident 
(though a disastrous one) due to carelessness of formulation. He discov-
ered, by August 1906, that it could not be put right within the framework of 
the theory, that is, with the abstraction operator as primitive and an axiom 
governing the condition for the identity of value-ranges: but the underlying 
error lay much deeper than a misconception concerning the foundations of 
set theory. It was an error affecting his entire philosophy. 58 
Exactly what Frege realized in late spring or the summer of 1906 
is not quite clear. Surmise is aided by the unfi nished manuscript 
of a response to an article of Arthur Schönfl ies’s. A list of headers 
includes, for parts unwritten, 
 Concepts which coincide in extension, although this extension falls under 
the one but not the other. 
 Remedy from extensions of second level concepts impossible. 
 Set theory in ruins. 59 
Clearly the hopes of the Appendix to volume II of  Grundgesetze had 
been dashed. 60 
 One  methodological error is Frege’s belief that in a logically per-
fect language all  properly formed singular terms must refer. As 
indicated above, there are ways to dilute the consequences of that 
principle, but it is, nevertheless, ill founded. 
 It is true that we usually do not use names that we know do not 
refer (save perhaps ones like ‘Santa Claus’ that have a recognized 
social context for their use). Standard logic codifi es usage with ref-
erential assumptions built in. Frege himself says that in a logically 
perfect language ‘no new sign shall be introduced as a proper name 
without being secured a reference’. He attempts to secure reference 
by stipulation. This way of proceeding is very much at odds with 
not just ordinary but also mathematical practice. 
that this need not be the comfort it may at fi rst seem: the naive comprehension 
principle is consistent in what Petr Hájek calls Basic Fuzzy Logic but the theory 
is not consistent with the existence of a set of natural numbers obeying a certain, 
moderately strong schema of mathematical induction (Petr Hájek, ‘On arithmetic 
in the Cantor–Lukasiewicz fuzzy set theory’,  Archive for Mathematical Logic , 44 
( 2005 ), pp. 763–82). 
 58  Dummett,  Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics , p. 223. 
 59  ‘On Schoenfl ies:  Die logischen Paradoxen der Mengenlehre ’,  PW , p. 176. 
 60  See further Dummett,  Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics , pp. 4–6. 
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 Our language contains general means for producing singular 
terms, e.g., defi nite descriptions. In  some sense they are part of our 
language: they are products of its generative capacity. But by and 
large they are not part of our  language-in-use . To take one of Frege’s 
own examples, exactly because there is no least rapidly convergent 
series, the mathematician has no use for the expression ‘the least 
rapidly convergent series’. True, false beliefs can lead one to use 
non-referring singular terms, but in use, in conversation say, mat-
ters will not run along normal lines if some parties are appraised of 
the facts that deny the term a reference. 
 Supported by theoretical claims, notably the aboutness thesis 
and the functional conception of concepts, connectives and quanti-
fi ers, which lead to the unassertibility of  singular negative existen-
tial claims, Frege mistakes a  defeasible presumption of reference in 
ordinary usage for a  presupposition . He then takes it as given that a 
properly systematic, logically perfected language must respect that 
supposed presupposition for all singular terms generable in the lan-
guage, not just those that have found a use to date. This leads to 
oddity but is not itself responsible for error. Error comes in the con-
trast between the treatment of  defi nite descriptions and of terms for 
extensions of concepts: the wholesale attribution of references with 
a particular characteristic – satisfaction of  Basic Law V – to the lat-
ter, the more relaxed who-cares-as-long-as-there-is-a-reference? atti-
tude to description-terms when not exactly one item falls under the 
concept involved. 
 10  Fregean  set-theory: retaining a semblance 
of Fregean preoccupations 
 What were called above Frege’s and Dummett’s trilemmata show 
that we cannot maintain all that Frege says about truth. But we 
can keep a fair amount and a surprisingly large simulacrum of the 
whole Fregean project, once we reject the  functional account of the 
connectives. To be more exact, we may maintain, with Frege:
  I)  Truth is unanalysable and  sui generis . 
  II)  For any assertoric sentence  P ,  P and ‘It is true that  P ’ express 
the same thought. 
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  III)  If singular terms are used in the ordinary way in sentences 
involving simple predications, what one intends to speak of 
is their reference. 
  IV)  Concepts map objects to truth-values. 
  V)  Simple, i.e. logically unstructured, predicates refer to con-
cepts (if they refer at all). 
  VI)  Our propositional logic is classical (at least for negation, 
conjunction and disjunction). 
  VII)  Sentences comprising a simple predication and one or more 
non-referring singular terms are neither true nor false. 
  VIII)  For reasoning within the scope of presumptions of refer-
ence, our fi rst-order logic is standard fi rst-order logic. 
  IX)  Basic Law V applies to extensions of concepts (or set abstracts) 
with second-order quantifi ers ranging over sharply defi ned 
concepts. I.e., we have α-Existence, α-Extensionality, and the 
Converse of α-Extensionality for the extension-of-a-concept 
vbto. 
What is unFregean is that 
  X)  We adopt the semantic conception of falsity. 
  XI)  We accept various truisms incompatible with the functional 
understanding of the logical connectives. 
  XII)  Our general, fi rst- and second-order logic is classical but 
free. 
  XIII)  For some sentences  P , it is true that not- P even though it 
is not false that  P . (This is how Dummett’s trilemma is 
evaded.) 
 In this setting, ‘¬∃ x ( x =  a )’ is true when  a does not refer, which is to 
the good. Furthermore, the logic being free, there is room to give an 
inferentialist account of vbtos, as does Tennant. 61 
 We have Basic Law V in form. It is consistent provided appropri-
ate constraints are placed on the range of the second-order variables, 
i.e . on what count as concepts. (The fi nite–co-fi nite subsets-of-N 
interpretation shows that consistency is attainable.) The hard work 
 61  Neil Tennant, ‘A general theory of abstraction operators’,  Philosophical Quarterly , 
54 ( 2004 ), pp. 105–33 (on which see further Peter Milne, ‘Existence, freedom, iden-
tity, and the logic of abstractionist realism’,  Mind , 116 ( 2007 ), pp. 23–53). 
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goes into what we might call ‘the theory of second-order ∃!’, which 
remains to be elaborated, i.e. in specifying concepts. What are the 
closure conditions of the domain of (extensions of) concepts? Which 
predicates with one free fi rst-order variable (and no free second-order 
variable) refer to concepts? Investigation of these topics puts a new 
spin on the old Quinean saw that second-order logic is set theory. 
 Appendix 
 We need several clauses to take care of  falsity, clauses providing a 
recursive account:
  (i)  For any atomic sentence  Rt 1 t 2 … t  n  
  It’s false that  Rt 1 t 2 … t  n  if, and only if, 
 ¬ Rt 1 t 2 … t  n  and ∃! t 1 and ∃! t 2 … and ∃! t  n  . 
(This applies as much to identity statements as any other atomic 
formulas.) 
  (ii)  For any assertoric sentence  P , 
  it’s false that ¬ P if, and only if,  P . 
  (iii)  For any assertoric sentences  P and  Q , 
  it’s false that  P ∨  Q if, and only if, it’s false that  P or it’s false 
that  Q . 
  (iv)  For any assertoric sentences  P and  Q , 
  it’s false that  P ∨ Q if, and only if, it’s false that P and it’s 
false that Q. 
 [(v) For any assertoric sentences P and Q, 
  it’s false that P → Q if it’s true that P and it’s false that Q.] 
 One feature of this account is to be noted. We have included a 
minimalist account of reference:
 ‘t’ refers if, and only if, ∃! t 
or, equivalently,
 ‘ t ’ refers if, and only if,  t =  t . 
This, on the face of it, is a rather unFregean thing to do. On the 
face of it, Frege would want to  explain the failure of ‘ t =  t ’ to be true 
by saying that ‘ t ’ fails to refer. But, on the other hand, he might be 
thought to come close to equating the two when he says, 
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 People certainly say that Odysseus is not an historical person, and mean by 
this contradictory expression that the name ‘Odysseus’ designates nothing, 
has no reference. 62 
It all rather depends on what he means by ‘mean’. He might, after 
all, just be saying that what people who say that Odysseus is not an 
historical person really mean to say, what they are trying to express 
by that – as he calls it, but he’s on dodgy ground in his own terms 
doing so – contradictory formulation, is that the name ‘Odysseus’ 
fails to refer. 
 It remains to extend the defi nition of falsity to the  fi rst-order 
quantifi ers. Here we make matters easy for ourselves by assum-
ing that every object has a name. There may, of course, be singular 
terms that do not refer. 
  (vi)  For any sentence ∀ x φ 
 it is false that ∀ x φ just in case, for some singular term  t , ∃! t and it 
is false that φ[ t / x ]. 
  (vii)  For any sentence ∃ x φ 
 it is false that ∃ x φ just in case, for every singular term  t , if ∃! t then 
it is false that φ[ t / x ]. 
 Our defi nition of truth being given by the equivalence scheme, 
we do not have, as yet,  any constraints on how either connectives 
or quantifi ers behave with respect to truth. But that is as it should 
be. If one holds that the equivalence thesis says all there is to say, 
fundamentally, about truth, one does not look to it to justify one’s 
logic. Rather, one looks to the logic to draw out consequences of the 
equivalence thesis. If the propositional logic is classical we fi nd that 
¬ p is true if, and only if,  p is not true. 
 What we do fi nd is that the negation–conjunction–disjunction 
fragment of classical propositional logic is sound and complete 
should we aim to obtain  Tappolet’s truisms. In similar truistic 
spirit, bearing in mind that some names may not refer, what we’d 
expect to hold for truth is this:
 (vi°) For any sentence ∀ x φ 
 62  ‘Introduction to logic’, p. 191. 
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it is true that ∀ x φ just in case, for all singular terms ‘ t ’, if ∃! t then it 
is true that φ[ t / x ]. 
 (vii°) For any sentence ∃ x φ 
 it is true that ∃ x φ just in case, for some singular term ‘ t ’, ∃! t , and it 
is true that φ[ t / x ]. 
 The logic we want will fail to be classical precisely because we 
are not granting that all singular terms refer, equivalently, we are 
not granting ∃! t , equivalently, ∃ x ( x =  t ), for all singular terms  t . So 
formulas of that form play a special role. We may adopt, for example, 
the natural deduction rules as laid out in Tennant’s  Natural Logic , 
including now his ‘denotation rule’, or we might take the axiomatic 
system of  Tyler Burge’s ‘Truth and singular terms’. 63 The denotation 
rule (or Burge’s axiom (A9)) has it that an atomic formula entails 
∃ x ( x =  t ) for any name occurring in it, and that’s what we want: an 
atomic sentence is true only if all the terms it contains refer. 
Ignoring the conditional and biconditional, this logic, however for-
mulated, is sound and complete with respect to truth-preservation 
as determined by our truisms (suppressing any worries, which are 
certainly not special to this context, issued by the appeal to a sub-
stitutional reading of the quantifi ers). 
 (Is it a truism, once we allow truth-value gaps, that a false conclu-
sion may only follow from premises at least one of which is false? 
Or that a false conclusion cannot follow from true premises?  If the 
former, our propositional logic is weakened, for the rules of disjunct-
ive syllogism, double negation introduction, and  ex falso quodlibet 
cease to hold.)  
 63  Tyler Burge, ‘Truth and singular terms’,  Noûs , 8 ( 1974 ), pp. 167–81; reprinted in 
M. Platts (ed.),  Reference, Truth and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1980), pp. 309–25. Both treat defi nite descriptions, which I have been studiously 
ignoring. Burge treats function symbols. 
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